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CORNELL
LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUmE 44

FALL, 1958

NUMBER 1

THE TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS OF AN
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT*
Calvert Magruderd
As so often happens in lectures like this, Dean Thoron asked me, for
publicity purposes, to send him a title to my remarks before I had written
down a word, or even before I had begun to organize my thoughts. I
obliged him at that point and sent him the title, "The Trials and Tribulations of an Intermediate Appellate Court." From this it follows that if
there proves to be any correspondence between what I shall say and the
announced title, that will be "purely coincidental."
In fact, the title implies that my court has had a rather rough time
of it. But membership on the court of appeals has seemed to me to be a
rather nice position, and certainly you can see for yourself that the job
has hardly worn me down, whatever might have been its trials and
tribulations.
Of course the functions of an appellate judge differ from those of a
trial judge. When I was appointed, one of my two elderly colleagues
was Judge James M. Morton. He had been for years a very successful
and able United States District Judge in the trial court of the federal
system. He regarded his so-called "promotion" to the court of appeals
as a sort of dignified retirement merited by his age and infirmities. The
story is told that Judge Morton once made a statement, at some bar association gathering, to the effect that "any solemn chump can get away
with being an appellate judge, but it takes an honest-to-God he-man to
be a good trial judge." My comment on that differentiation would be that
it was not quite fair to the appellate judge. I would agree that it is easier
for any "solemn chump" to "get away" with being an appellate judge
than to "get away" with being a trial judge. But merely "getting away"
with something, of course, is not the whole story. I would contend that
one needs to be much more than a "solemn chump" to deserve the accolade of being a good appellate judge.
* This article was delivered as the forty-first annual Frank Irvine Lecture at the Cornell
Law School on May 3, 1958.

t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 74, for biographical data.
1
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The circuit judge does share with the district judge the common factor
that we are both judges, and therefore it becomes important to observe
our relationships as judges with the lawyers. As you are aware, there are
certain amenities which the lawyer customarily observes. Whatever may
be his private opinion of the judge, the lawyer maintains what sometimes
may seem to be an obsequious and exaggerated deference to "his Honor,"
who may be wrong in the particular instance, or who may be making an
ass of himself-only the lawyer does not say so, openly and bluntly, in
so many words.
But these amenities which lead the lawyer to refrain from showing
the judge up are, or ought to be, a two-way street. It would be hitting
below the belt for a judge, secure in the immunity with which he is
cloaked by the courtesy of lawyers, to bawl him out when he knows the
lawyer will feel a reluctance to answer back. The judge needs to be, on
his part, respectful to the feelings of the lawyer and should refrain from
the temptation, sometimes prompted by arrogance, to humiliate the lawyer
before his client or before the public.
Of course, judges are recruited from the ranks of the lawyers, and
wrapping a black robe around a lawyer does not invest him with any
more wisdom or legal competence than he had before. The judge's aura
of immunity resulting from the exercise by lawyers of these professional
amenities certainly has some aspect of fraud and fakery, so that perhaps
it may be wondered why such customs have been accepted tacitly as the
proper professional practice.
The answer is, I suppose, that this is but a phase of institutional prestige that envelops all public officials, not only judges-a prestige that
tends to condition the uninstructed general public more readily to accept
as binding what the public official may do. When one has done his best
to perform a public task, it is always comforting to be buttressed by a
little prestige, meretricious or otherwise. A public official, even on occasions the President of the United States, may give utterance to some
banality, some truism, which the ordinary man in the street would not
have the nerve to say, because of its transparent emptiness. But coming
from the public official, such a comment may be quoted with the utmost
solemnity by the press, as implying that the trite remark constitutes the
very embodiment of prescience and wisdom. This all contributes to
building up the prestige of the office, and renders the acts of the official
more readily acceptable to the general public.
This institutional prestige, therefore, serves a useful purpose, and is not
.athing lightly to be cast into the discard by the protected official. Public
officials, judges included, must not, then, be too frank in "letting down
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their hair" in public. The important caution is that the public official
must not let himself be deceived, by this deference and prestige that
surround him, into thinking that he is any better than he really is.
In an intermediate appellate court, such as mine, the maintenance of
this institutional prestige of the courts imposes upon us a certain judicial
etiquette in our dealing with judges lower in the federal system, whose
acts we are called upon to review on appeal. We also have imposed upon
us certain amenities in our dealings with the Supreme Court of the United
States, which of course has the final say, and which may, and often does,
say that we were wrong.
As to the trial judges, we must always bear in mind that they may be
as good lawyers as we are, or better. They are under the disadvantage of
often having to make rulings off the cuff, so to speak, in the press and
urgency of a trial proceeding, and the main reason we on appeal may have
a better chance of being right is that we have more time for reflection
and study. Hence, we should approach our task of judicial review with
a certain genuine humility. We should never unnecessarily try to make a
monkey of the judge in the court below, or to trespass on his feelings or
dignity and self-respect. Sometimes we may have contributed to an
erroneous ruling below by an incautious statement made by us in an
earlier opinion, in which case we should take care to point out that this
is so, and that we may have been to blame for misleading the district
court, which was only trying to follow us.1 Sometimes we may have
occasion to reverse a judge of the district court on a ground not presented
to it, or considered below. If so, we should be at pains to point that out.L 2
And if the district court has written a careful and full opinion, with
which we agree, and which we feel unable to improve upon, we should
affirm on the opinion of the court below.3
In recent years we have been somewhat embarrassed by appeals, in
criminal as well as in civil cases, where the main point raised by appellant
was that biased and partial actions by the trial judge so outrageously
interfered with the orderly development of the case by counsel as to
deny to appellant the essence of a fair trial before an impartial tribunal.
If we think that appellant's point is well taken, we have no escape but
to say so, however much this determination is inevitably a slap in the
face of the district judge.4 But we have assured the bar of our reluctance
to accept as true such a serious charge without the court's being thoroughly acquainted with the whole atmosphere of the trial, which can only be
I See Workingmen's Loan Ass'n v. United States, 142 F.2d 359, 360 (1st Cir. 1944).
2 See Keene Lumber Co. v. Leventhal, 165 F.2d 815, 823 (1st Cir. 1948).
3 See Norton v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 219 F.2d 706 (1st Cir. 1955).
4 See Crowe v. Di Manno, 225 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1955).
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achieved by a careful reading of the trial transcript from beginning to
end.5
Now as to our relations with our superior tribunal, the Supreme Court
of the United States. Here too, we have to play the game according to
certain well-accepted rules, and it makes no difference what our private
opinion might be as to whether certain justices of the Supreme Court
know more, or less, than we do about the law. We should always express a respectful deference to controlling decisions of the Supreme
Court, and do our best to follow them. We should leave it to the Supreme
Court to overrule its own cases.
I have always thought that the prevailing majority of our court did
the right thing in United States v. Girouard,6 where we accepted a neveroverruled precedent in the Supreme Court, though we got reversed for
doing so. Of course the Supreme Court, in reversing our judgment,
pursuant to the institutional obligation it owed to us, was careful to
point out that we had merely followed an undistinguishable and neveroverruled precedent by the Supreme Court, which that Court then
proceeded to overrule.7 On the other hand, it appears to me that the
three-judge court in the fourth circuit, in the second Flag Salute case,
did an unseemly thing in counting noses, so as to speculate as to whether
the Supreme Court, as reconstructed, would be likely to adhere to its
ruling in the first Flag Salute case, decided only a few years earlier.'
It was no less unseemly, though in the result Judge Parker guessed right
as to what the Supreme Court would ultimately do.' Statistics will show
that in these two cases the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit got
itself reversed whereas the Fourth Circuit got affirmed. But that only
goes to show that statistics do not necessarily tell the full story.
But what are we supposed to do when we have no controlling precedent
in the Supreme Court on all fours with our case, as the saying goes, but
where we find expressions in previous opinions which may serve to
indicate the slant which the justices might have as to the particular
problem?
Well, there are at least two ways in which we could deal with a
situation like that, and we have tried both of them. Just why, in a
particular case, we may have chosen to follow one rather than the other
course, may indeed be difficult to determine.
5

See Melor Shoe Corp. v. Pierce & Stevens, 249 F.2d 305 (1st Cir. 1957); Daley v.

United States, 231 F.2d 123, 128 (1st Cir. 1956).

149 F.2d 760 (1st Cir. 1945).
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). See also, State Tax Commission v.
Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 176 (1942).
8 See Barnette v. West Virginia State Board of Education, 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.
6
7

W. Va. 1942).
9

See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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(1) The first method is perhaps the more modest one. Since we are
only a half-way house of judicial review, it might be said that we should
focus on previous cases in the Supreme Court to see what consequences
would flow from them as a matter of logic, and examine the dicta in
that Court, all with the purpose of concluding, if possible, how the
Supreme Court would probably deal with the problem. That course I
chose in the famous, or notorious, case of Sampson v. Channell,10 where
I concluded that, from the logic and reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins," it would follow that in a diversity case
the federal district court should apply, as part of the substantive law
of the state wherein the district court sits, the local rules of conflict
of laws as understood and applied in the state tribunals.
(2) The second method is to assume that the Supreme Court, in a
matter on which it has not specifically ruled, is entitled to the benefit of
whatever illumination the court of appeals may be able to throw upon
the question of what ought to be the law, untrammeled by dicta or logicchopping from previous opinions of the Supreme Court which might
point to the opposite conclusion. That method we pursued in McClennen
v. Commissioner.2 We thought the Court was shaky in some of the
things it said in Bull v. United States," but in any event we thought the
case could be distinguished. Treating the case with the utmost respect as
a "peculiar case on its facts and in the way the case came up,"' 4 we
even professed to find, perhaps with tongue in cheek, that there were
implications in Bull v. United States pointing to the conclusion we were
inclined to reach in the case then before us.
It may be that a bit of psychiatric introspection would disclose why I
chose to follow one method in Sampson v. Channell and a different
method in McClennen v. Commissioner. I do not tax my brain too much
with such speculations, because whatever conclusion one might come
up with would be suspect as a mere rationalization. All too often we have
to realize that the case might be written up either way, in a lawyer-like
opinion. The judge may not recognize that this is so, or even be conscious of the inner springs which lead him to choose one result rather
than the other. Perhaps here effective advocacy does its more subtle
work in persuading the judge that he wants the case to come out one way
rather than the other.
In the case of Sampson v. Channell, subsequent events proved that I
had guessed right as to what the Supreme Court would do, both on the
10 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940).
11 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

12 131 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1942).
13 295 U.S. 247 (1935).

14 McClennen v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 165, 169 (Ist Cir. 1942).
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'conflicts point and on the question whether the rule as to burden of
proof was to be treated as a matter of substance or procedure for the
particular purpose at hand. 5 But of course that does not prove that I
chose the right method in Sampson v. Channell. If the conclusion reached
in that case is as wrong and unfortunate as I understand they now say
it is in the class on federal jurisdiction at Harvard Law School, assuming I was competent to write a persuasive opinion the other way, who
knows but that I might have succeeded in persuading even the Supreme
Court to take that view, in a matter which, after all, they had never
focused on before.
For what it is worth, and maybe it is worth nothing, I submit this ex
post facto rationalization of why I did what I did in these two cases.
Perhaps I liked the result which I arrived at, following the method I
chose in Sampson v. Ckannell. When I was law clerk to Justice Brandeis,
6
he said, speaking for the Court in Kryger v. Wilson:'
It is apparent from the above statement that there has been no lack of
due process ....

The most that the plaintiff in error can say is that the

state court made a mistaken application of doctrines of the conflict of
laws in deciding that the cancellation of a land contract is governed by
the law of the situs instead of the place of making and performance. But
that, being purely a question of local common law, is a matter with which
this court is not concerned.
I have always thought that proposition was pretty good, for the Supreme
Court of the United States has too much other essential work to do to
become also the final arbiter in conflicts questions. Its necessarily
episodic dealing with conflicts problems is not likely to contribute helpfully to the development of the subject. And if the Supreme Court was
to become the final arbiter of conflicts problems only in diversity cases,
!hen its influence on the state courts in non-diversity cases, in the direction of developing a uniform law, would likely be nil, as was proved by
the broader experience under Swift v. Tyson." While the prescription
that one must follow the substantive law of the state in diversity cases
would seem to take lots of fun out of the federal judge's function in
*diversitycases, yet this is perhaps so only theoretically. For the federal
judge, if he professes solemnly to be seeking out the rule that is
applicable in the state tribunal, can usually reach the result he thinks
ought to be reached, since more likely than not he will find the state law
pronouncements on the particular point to be ambiguous or inconclusive.
15 Klaxon v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
(1941).
16 242 U.S. 171, 176 (1916).

17 See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938).
18 See Mason v. The American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957);
Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604 (1st Cir. 1953).
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On the other hand, when it came to McClennen v. Commissioner, I
thought I knew something about the law of partnership, and I felt pretty
confident as to what the tax consequences should be in that estate tax
case. To reach the result I thought ought to be reached, it was necessary to deal somewhat roughly, though very respectfully, of course, with
the Supreme Court case of Bull v. United States, which was the main
reliance of the taxpayer. Certiorari was not applied for by the losing
taxpayer in the McClennen case.
We cannot adopt the easy, slap-dash view that what the court of
appeals does is really not important, because the Supreme Court has the
last word. When Congress created the system of intermediate courts of
appeals, in 1891, it was with the idea of taking a load off the Supreme
Court of the United States, so that that Court might perform better its
primary function of mediator in the federal system. The Supreme Court
retains a discretionary power of ultimate review, upon certiorari, but
as you well know the Supreme Court is just too busy to grant a writ of
certiorari in all cases. Therefore, we have to do our job thoroughly and
well, in order to fulfill what is expected of us. It is obvious that if we
get too bad, the Supreme Court will have to load itself up with routine
cases, to the detriment of its more important business.
I don't think we have become too bad, and the result is that in the vast
majority of cases that are brought to us, what we say becomes the final
word on appeal. If I may quote briefly from some statistics: in the
five-year period from October 1951 to September 1956, inclusive, out
of a total of 570 cases docketed in our court, the Supreme Court was
applied to for a writ of certiorari in only 110, and the number of
certiorari petitions which the Supreme Court granted was only 12. As a
result of review by the Supreme Court of our work during this five-year
period, seven of our judgments were affirmed, and five were reversed,
which made an average reversal of only one case per year over the five:year period.
It is probably only a coincidence that three of the five opinions of
ours which were reversed were written by me on behalf of the court.
Now, I don't enjoy getting reversed any more than any other judge, and
when that happens, my first impulse is to repair to the nearest tavern
and "cuss out" the Supreme Court. Sometimes, after we have given long
study to a case and written a careful opinion, we find ourselves reversed
by the Supreme Court in an opinion that strikes us as superficial and
hastily prepared. We eventually cool off, when we come to realize that
the opinion may indeed be superficial and hastily drawn from the very
necessities and pressures under which the Supreme Court has to do its
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work. Another thing that tends to cool us off is the realization that,
were our positions reversed, and were we required to perform our work
in the environment and under the pressures prevailing in the Supreme
Court, we probably could not do so good a job as they do.
I do say without hesitation that where a court of appeals has written
a full opinion which evidences a careful and painstaking study of the
case, the Supreme Court of the United States owes it an institutional
obligation not to reverse us except upon filing a reasoned opinion undertaking to show that our conclusion was mistaken. The only exceptions
to this proposition that I can think of at the moment are two: (1) Where
the Supreme Court can cite, and rely upon, a supervening decision of
its own in another case, which obviously covers our case and which
serves well enough to indicate why it thinks we went wrong; (2) where
the court of appeals has lost the confidence of the Supreme Court, which
wishes curtly to manifest that lack of confidence to the world.
In this connection one case that still burns me up is Pino v. Nicolls.9
The question there was the validity of an order for the deportation of an
alien, on the statutory ground that the deportee at some time after his
entry into the United States had been "convicted of two crimes involving
moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of
whether the convictions were in a single trial." There was no issue as
to one of the two offenses, namely, carnal abuse of a female child. The
only question presented to us on appeal was whether, as the records stood
in the Third District Court of Eastern Middlesex, Massachusetts, it
could be said that the alien stood convicted of the crime of petit larceny.
It was not suggested to us that the crime of petit larceny was not a crime
involving moral turpitude, within the meaning of the federal statute. We
held, in a lengthy opinion, which after all turned upon the niceties of
local Massachusetts law, that the alien did stand convicted in the Third
District Court of Eastern Middlesex of the crime of petit larceny.
The Supreme Court in its wisdom granted a writ of certiorari. Upon
review, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed our judgment, in a fiveline per curiam opinion that magisterially stated: "On the record here
we are unable to say that the conviction has attained such finality as to
support an order of deportation within the contemplation of § 241 of the
20
Immigration and Nationality Act. The judgment is reversed.1
Now, why were we treated that way by the Supreme Court? There
was no question of a controlling supervening decision of the Supreme
19 215 F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1954).

20 Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955).
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Court. And I am sure that as a court we had not forfeited the confidence
of the Supreme Court; so we have not believed, even for a moment, that
the Supreme Court was taking an occasion to manifest sharply its lack
of confidence in us.
Of course, it is possible that the members of the Supreme Court, for
one reason or another, wanted to save the alien from deportation, but
that no extensive opinion supporting that conclusion could obtain acceptance by a majority of the justices. That possibility I can understand, for the justices of the Supreme Court, like the rest of us, are only
human. Maybe the justices felt that they could not avoid doing what
they did. Whether there were other available ways of handling the
situation I don't know. Oftentimes the Supreme Court announces two
or more opinions by minority groups on the Court, no one opinion commanding the support of a majority, though a majority do concur in the
announced judgment. Perhaps something like that might have been done
in this case. However that may be, it is certainly true that the Supreme
Court owed the court of appeals the obligation of furnishing a reasoned
statement for reversing us, and whatever might have been the explanation of why the justices did not fulfill that obligation, it is still true
that the Supreme Court must be charged with an institutional failure in
its summary treatment of the court of appeals in that case.
Realistically, we must recognize that there are certain types of cases
in which, if we dare to "stick our necks out," we are pretty sure to get
reversed.
One such case is where a fellow claims to be a seaman. Because seamen as a class are supposed to be defenseless and unable to look out for
themselves, the expression has grown up that "seamen are wards of the
admiralty." But I wouldn't suppose that a man is entitled to this special
protecting arm of the judiciary merely on his claim to be a seaman. At
all events, in Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co.,21 a plaintiff had
claimed to be entitled, as a seaman, to sue for damages under the Jones
Act. If he were not a seaman he could not maintain such an action,
and his exclusive remedy would have been a claim for workmen's compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, as provided by Congress in the Defense Bases Act. We held, as a
matter of law, that the man could not, on the proven facts, reasonably
be found to be a seaman, and so we affirmed the judgment of the district
court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and reversed us on April
7, 1958, in a per curiam opinion informing us briefly:
We hold, in agreement with the Court of Appeals, that 42 U.S.C. § 1654
saves the remedy under the Jones Act created for a member of a crew of
21

245 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1957).
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any vessel. We hold further, however, in disagreement with the Court of
Appeals, that the petitioner's evidence presented an evidentiary basis for a
jury's 22
finding whether or not the petitioner was a member of a crew of any
vessel.
This time we picked up a few dissents.
If, upon retrial of the case, a jury holds that the plaintiff was a seaman, we shall have to accept that determination of fact under the Jones
Act, unless, of course, the record contains different evidence, because
the Supreme Court has told us that whether the man was, or was not, a
seaman, constituted, on the evidence presented, a factual issue which had
to be submitted to the jury. We always try faithfully to follow a
decision of our superiors. But if another case comes up, where a party's
claim to be a seaman seems to us to be as preposterous as in the Grimes
case, as in our humble view the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan
in the latter case well demonstrated, I am afraid that we shall again
"stick our necks out" and say, as a matter of law, that the man is not a
seaman, thereby courting another probable reversal by the Supreme
Court.
Another familiar situation where we are pretty likely to get reversed
is where, in a case under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, we either
affirm the trial court in giving judgment for the railroad, pursuant to a
verdict directed for the defendant, or reverse a judgment for the plaintiff
on the ground that the district court committed error in submitting the
issues of negligence or causation to the jury. In New York, New Haven
& Hartford Railroad Co. v. Dox 3 we explained what we have to do in
cases of this sort, as long as the Supreme Court continues to tell us that
the plaintiff has the burden of establishing negligence and causation in
suits under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Pointing out, what
cannot be denied, that a "plaintiff's right to a jury trial, as guaranteed
by the Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution, is not an unqualified right to have the jury pass on issues of negligence and proximate cause in all cases ... )"24 we said that in such cases an intermediate
appellate court has an inescapable function to perform in deciding
whether the plaintiff proved enough to get his case to the jury. "We
have to perform that function honestly and conscientiously, let the chips
fall where they may, in so far as possible further appellate review is
concerned."'2 5
We are not obliged, as part of our institutional obligation to the
22 356 U.S. 252,
23 249 F.2d 572
24 Id. at 573.
25 Id. at 574.

253 (1958).

(1st Cir. 1957).
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Supreme Court, to express agreement with everything the Supreme Court
may choose to do. It is true, the Supreme Court has the final word, so
far as the disposition of the particular case is concerned. That is indeed
an awesome power, though it is unavoidable, for there needs be some
ultimate tribunal; and in one sense it is no doubt true, as Stone, J.,
dissenting, said of the Supreme Court in United States v. Butler, that
"the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of
self-restraint. 28
But the Supreme Court, though there is no appeal to any other
tribunal from its decisions, surely must desire that its decisions
meet with the approval of an enlightened bar. And the Supreme Court
must know that, if it pushes its exercise of power too far, it will inevitably
generate corrective measures, for in the long run the people in a democracy cannot afford to allow their ultimate destiny to be determined
by the naked will of a majority of nine justices appointed to the Supreme
Court for life. How far the Court should go in a particular case necessarily involves an exercise of judgment. Over the long years the Supreme
Court, because of changes in its membership, has oscillated between the
right and the left. Historically, as one group or another in the country
has been displeased with something the Supreme Court has done, loud
squawks and demands for "curbing the power of the Supreme Court"
have been heard. But you don't shoot the umpire just because you don't
like his decision, even where you believed he called the decision wrong.
That path is the way of chaos and anarchy. Strident voices in our midst
conveniently overlook the kind of value judgments the Supreme Court
has to make in resolving conflicts between the states and nation in a
federal system; in deciding concretely whether certain conduct involves
an "unreasonable" search and seizure within the prohibition of the fourth
amendment, or whether there has been "excessive bail" or "cruel and
unusual punishments" within the prohibition of the eighth amendment,
or a denial of "due process of law" within the prohibition of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, or a denial of the "equal protection of the laws"
within the prohibition of the fourteenth amendment.
One may think that the judgment exercised by the Supreme Court in
one or another of these difficult situations is unfortunate and indeed
unstatesmanlike, but it must never be forgotten that the answers to
questions of this sort are not to be derived from a simple reading of some
constitutional text.
Therefore I think it is our institutional obligation, as it is the obligation of all good citizens, to rally to the defense of the Supreme Court as
26 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936).
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against such crackpot legislation as has been proposed, for instance, by
Senator Jenner in S. 2646. That bill is framed as an exercise of the
legislative power of Congress under section 2 of Article III of the Constitution to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
the United States. The bill proposes to take away from the Supreme
Court the jurisdiction to review, either by appeal, writ of certiorari, or
otherwise, any of five described types of cases in which the Supreme
Court has recently rendered decisions displeasing to Senator Jenner.
As was well said by Dean Griswold in a recent statement in opposition
to S. 2646:
It is the American tradition to criticize court decisions freely, and that
is as it should be. No one thinks that courts are inevitably right; but
they are the institutions which are established in our system to make
decisions in justiciable controversies, to resolve the difficult questions
where there are conflicting claims of right. Decisional law has always
grown and developed by a process of trial and error. Where a case has
been found to have gone too far, it is later qualified or distinguished, or
even overruled. This is the function of courts. It is through this process,
as the future Lord Mansfield said more than 200 years ago, that decisional
law "works itself pure." There is no doubt that this process will continue
in decisions of the Supreme Court. No possible good that I can see will
be served by taking away from the Supreme Court power to perform this
judicial function in the types of cases specified in the pending Bill.
The Jenner Bill does not purport to disturb the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts; so, how does the bill tend to promote decisions in
those lower federal courts more to the Senator's liking? Would not a
lower federal court, in applying the law to a particular case, feel bound
to give effect to a decision rendered by the Supreme Court at a time
when that Court undoubtedly had final jurisdiction to pass upon the
subject matter? And of course, as Dean Griswold pointed out, if there
were conflicting decisions in various courts of appeals, there would be no
tribunal empowered to resolve the conflicts if the Supreme Court were
bereft of jurisdiction in such cases.
I don't suppose that the Jenner Bill is to be taken too seriously. I
should be greatly surprised if the Congress enacted the bill, or anything
like it. I should be even more surprised if the President should sign
such a bill, if enacted.
With all the perplexities one has to face in the capacity of judge, it
is soothing and comforting to return from time to time to the classroom,
where the law professor does not have the burden of coming down off the
fence and deciding the case, but may pitch his difficulties to the students,
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with discussion of the considerations on the one hand and on the other,
and an adjuration to the students to make up their own minds. Despite
my appointment to the court in 1939, I have clung tenaciously at least
to the shadow of my former vocation, for I have continued to teach a
section of Torts at the Harvard Law School. If it may be said that I am
thus leading a sort of a double life, I must plead guilty. I can only say
that that is the hand of cards dealt to me by an inscrutable Providence,
and I have liked the hand too much to toss it in.

